


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REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the East Asia/Pacific Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Mao's Legacy and China's Foreign Policy

On April 15, 1977, China's new leadership released Volume V of Mao Tse-tung's *Selected Works* to the public with great fanfare and ceremony. Unlike the earlier volumes of Mao's speeches and articles, this is the first time Mao himself did not control the final selection and annotation of articles. The conclusion drawn from this, most succinctly stated by Ross Munro in the *Christian Science Monitor*, is that "by analyzing how the works from 1949 to 1957 (the years covered in the new edition) are compiled and annotated, it will perhaps be possible to gain some clues for understanding in what direction the post-Mao Chinese leaders plan to take the country." This is not an unwarranted conclusion, but a few caveats must be mentioned.

First of all, the preparatory work for the new edition did not begin with Mao's death in September 1976. According to an article by Hua Kuo-feng, Mao himself expressed interest in compiling a fifth volume of his works as early as 1969, and delegated the task to Chou En-lai and Kang Sheng. It should be assumed that at least a portion of this work was completed by 1976, and that Mao was consulted along the way. A second consideration is the political hazard involved in altering Mao's works, using them too selectively or distorting them. The "gang of four" attacked Teng Hsiao-ping for doing this, and the Hua regime has accused the "gang" of exactly the same crime. The present leadership would leave itself open to later attack if it were to perform such surgery on Mao's canons. In that regard, it is interesting to note that, in comparison with earlier volumes, there are fewer explanatory footnotes and annotations in Volume V. Mao's words are allowed to stand by themselves, with little exegesis.

The most important consideration in analyzing Volume V is, of course, the selection of articles and speeches

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from the vast body of Mao's words over this eight-year period. Mao, of course, is nothing if not a flexible theoretician. His words have been used, with or without his consent, to bolster lesser leaders at all points along the Chinese political spectrum. It is beyond doubt, then, that the new regime has selected those speeches and articles which best support their policy intentions. Certainly, Volume V would have been markedly different if Chang Chun-chiao had been in charge of compiling it.

In the realm of foreign relations, Volume V does not appear to signal any shifts from current policies. This in itself is significant insofar as the 1949-57 period can be generally described as the period of the greatest Sino-Soviet amity and greatest Sino-US hostility. In other words, the Hua regime editors have used the 1949-57 Mao to support the 1960-76 Mao in the realm of foreign policy, a piece of historical revision with which Mao himself probably would have concurred. This is accomplished in two ways in Volume V. One is in the exclusion of certain speeches or articles from this period [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The other method is in the rather calm, detached, and generally bland discussion of the Soviet Union and the US that is included in the new volume.

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There is, not surprisingly, little in Volume V that could be construed as even the faintest of praise for the US or its allies. The discussion of the US, however, could have been a great deal harsher than it is. Volume IV, for instance, ends up with a series of articles personally denouncing various US leaders and their policies. This theme does not continue in Volume V, nor are Volume V readers treated to the kind of vitriolic condemnation of American society that became such standard fare in the Chinese press during the Korean war. Mao in Volume V mentions "contradictions" within US society on several occasions, but does not go into any detail. It is quite possible that certain portions have been edited out of this discussion. To be sure, the attitude toward the US is consistently antipathetic and derogatory, but many of the criticisms, even during the Korean war period, seem somewhat unemotional and stereotyped. There are many strong statements, of course, such as in "The Atomic Bomb Cannot Frighten the Chinese People," and "US Imperialism Is a Paper Tiger," but given the nature of the US-Chinese relationship at that time, they seem rather mild.

There is a noticeable lack of material on Chinese relations with the rest of the world. Although there are various references to solidarity with the oppressed peoples of the world, support for revolutions, and unity with all who oppose imperialism, there is a lack of detail. Mao, of course, left the majority of the detailed work on foreign policy to Premier Chou En-lai, who was quite active during this period seeking recognition and normalized relations with the nonaligned world.

In sum, Volume V, as far as foreign policy is concerned, is rather bland. Mao is not lavish in his praise

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of the Soviets before 1956, nor harsh in his criticism of them thereafter. His discussion of the US is often derogatory, but usually desultory. Mao's chief interests during this period were not foreign policy related--that came later. From 1949-1957, Mao was chiefly concerned with economic recovery and development, party consolidation, and suppression of opposition. He linked these interests to China's relationship with the Soviet Union only later, though some dissatisfaction is evident in these writings.

It is interesting to note that the regime has thus far done little to direct Chinese readers toward the foreign policy articles in Volume V. The introductory article by the compilation committee selects passages which criticize both the US and USSR, and Hua Kuo-feng's long *People's Daily* article of May 1, 1977 does likewise.

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A May 7 *People's Daily* article seeks to correct the impression that the Chinese are attempting to balance their relations with the US and USSR. "In the 1960s and 1970s, a change took place in the world situation. The emergence of Soviet social-imperialism provided the world with another outstanding teacher by negative example. Like the other superpower, it became the common enemy of the world's people.... The role which Soviet social-imperialism is playing as a teacher by negative example cannot be matched by anyone in the world today." It is possible that such statements reflect the regime's concern that even their careful selections of Mao's writings not lead to any confusion concerning the main anti-Soviet orientation of China's present foreign policy.

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25X1Yu Chiu-li's Message to Taching

① The national Taching industrial conference, which reaffirmed, in general, the pragmatic developmental goals usually associated with the late Chou En-lai, closed in Peking on May 13 after a series of well-organized but rather unspectacular meetings, speeches, and reports. Although both Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and Minister of National Defense Yeh-chien-ying spoke at the Taching conference, it was State Planning Commission Chief Yu Chiu-li who provided the most informative report.

① In his report, Yu Chiu-li complained that despite the serious damage done to China's industrial production--especially within the iron and steel industry--by the "gang of four," most industries had made impressive gains since the purge of the leading leftists. However, instead of complementing the iron and steel industry, Yu merely asserted that it was now in a position to "end its stagnation and advance steadily."

① The overriding message of Yu's report was as straightforward as the famous "Taching spirit," itself: strict discipline and hard work are essential for China's immediate economic recovery and future modernization. However, Yu did make reference to the sensitive issue of wage reform, an issue which has created many serious tensions between the leadership and the workers in recent years. But Yu's reference to the wage reform issue was both indirect and noncommittal. He first condemned material incentives in general as incorrect Soviet-style practices that had been mistakenly applied to the Chinese economy in the early 1950s. Yu then dodged the issue completely by announcing that a "special conference" would be held sometime in the future to "tackle the problems involved in employment and wage rates."

② Yu Chiu-li's report was a remarkable combination of Mao Tse-tung's "great leap forward" spirit and Chou En-lai's reasoned pragmatism. At one point, Yu quoted from a Mao

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speech originally given to a meeting of leading party cadres in advance of the eighth national party congress in 1956, but first released only recently in Volume V of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*. In this speech Mao instructed the cadres that it was "an obligation" to overtake the US economically "in 50 or 60 years." Yu then referred to Chou En-lai's report to the fourth national people's congress of 1975 where the late premier laid down the pragmatic but ambitious program for modernizing China before the turn of the century. Finally, in his own words, Yu asserted that rapid industrial development through hard work and strict discipline was "not only absolutely necessary but entirely possible."

① Yu's skillful use of the "legacies" of both Mao
Tse-tung and Chou En-lai appears to be a deliberate attempt
② to create the memory of a competent but faithful Chou led
by a visionary but rational Mao. This image of Chou,
apparently created by a man with close connections in the
past to Chou and Teng Hsiao-ping, may, however, be the
creation of Hua Kuo-feng, who would stand to gain the
most by "keeping Chou in his place."

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Military Debate Continues

① The debate over how much stress to place on modernizing the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has surfaced again. This time, it appeared most clearly at the recently concluded Taching conference in the issue of whether the danger of war should be featured as an important reason for speeding up industrialization.

① Chairman Hua, in his major address on May 9, stated two reasons for accelerating industrial development: time is rapidly running out if China is to achieve Mao's and Chou's goal of modernizing China by the year 2000; and, since war is inevitable, China should be made "strong and prosperous as soon as possible." Hua did not dwell on the danger of war, however, and he reminded his audience that the PLA had overcome its stronger enemies with "millet plus rifles" in the 1940s, suggesting that the military should be content for the time being with the weapons it already has.

③ Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying's speech at the Taching conference, although emphatically stating that modern industry must be developed as a basis for military modernization, laid considerably more stress on the war preparations theme than Hua's. Yeh expanded the Maoist dictum that industry should support national defense as well as agriculture. Furthermore, he noted that "we must ceaselessly strengthen national defense capabilities." Elsewhere, Yeh predicted that "a big war will break out at an early date (emphasis added). Finally, Yeh referred to Mao's 1956 speech on the "Ten Major Relationships" only in the context of geographical redistribution of industry. Yeh made no reference to another section of Mao's speech that directed reductions in military spending in order to spur industrial development. Earlier this year, Mao's speech formed the context for sharp differences over the relative priority that should be assigned to "economic" construction and defense industry.

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③ Civilian Politburo member Chi Teng-Kuei's closing
speech of the Taching conference was also noteworthy in
that it completely ignored the war preparation theme as
a rationale for speeding industrial development. Also,
④ on the same day, *People's Daily* published a highly po-
lemical article on nuclear weapons which emphatically
restated the traditional line that men were more im-
portant than weapons and featured a quote from Volume V

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25X1Cracking Down in China's Schools

Since the purge of the gang of four in October 1976, the Chinese government has made a number of efforts to improve the quality of China's educational system. One of the most important of these has been an attempt to restore discipline in the schools, many of which have been torn by factional struggles and undermined by lax educational policies since the Cultural Revolution.

Plans to tighten educational standards and restore discipline were formulated as early as 1973 by the architects of China's "four modernizations," including Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-ping. These, however, were scuttled as a result of strong opposition from an alliance of top leaders led by the "gang of four." The campaign that led to the purge of Teng Hsiao-ping in April 1976, in fact, began when leftists attacked reform measures proposed by Teng and the late minister of education, Chou Jung-hsin. The purge of the gang of four has led to renewed efforts to reform educational policy.

One of these efforts is the attempt to restore discipline in the schools. It first became apparent in early 1977 in a number of news articles attacking the gang of four for undermining the authority of teachers and encouraging students to revolt. An article in *People's Daily* on February 23, for instance, denounced the gang for wanting to "make revolution without teachers" and for encouraging students to believe that their job was only to transform other people's attitudes, not their own. A piece in *Kuangming Daily* on March 28, was even harsher, charging that the gang had "upset the regular order of schools," abolished school discipline and "rational rules and regulations," and "tried by every means to create chaos in schools." This was contrary to Mao Tse-tung's principles. "Revolutionary school discipline and rational rules and regulations," the article said, "are a guarantee for carrying out Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line in education and fulfilling the

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education and teaching tasks more satisfactorily." Order and discipline, according to the article, are as essential to schools as to the state.

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